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National Treatment on Internal Taxation:  
Revisiting GATT Article III:2
Sherzod Shadikhodjaev
This paper examines GATT Article III:2 on national treatment on internal taxation. The 
fact that as of 1 January 2008, national treatment violations in the goods sector have 
been challenged in nearly 29% of the WTO complaints points to the great importance of 
the national treatment principle in the multilateral trading system on the one hand, and 
temptation of WTO Members to protect domestic production through internal taxes and 
regulations on the other. The examination of a claim on a discriminatory internal tax 
requires a multi-tiered test of several issues including likeness, discriminatory threshold 
and protective application of the tax measure. This test applies differently depending on 
what sentence of Article III:2 is at issue. The controversial “aim-and-effect” approach 
is not relevant to the determination of likeness, but can still be utilized, to some extent, 
in examining the protective application of the measure concerned. Korea and its FTA 
partners have affirmed their adherence to GATT Article III. When the FTA parties enter 
into a dispute over national treatment, a problem as to the jurisdiction of WTO panels 
over FTA’s GATT-plus provisions on national treatment may arise. Irrespective of what 
dispute settlement forum is resorted to, GATT-plus provisions, as a lex posterior, would 
prevail over the corresponding provisions of Article III. 
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ⓒ 2008  KIEPExecutive  Summary
This  paper  examines  GATT  Article  III:2  on  national  treatment  on 
internal  taxation.  The  fact  that  as  of  1  January  2008,  national 
treatment  violations  in  the  goods  sector  have  been  challenged  in 
nearly 29% of the WTO complaints points to the great importance of 
the national treatment principle in the multilateral trading system on 
the  one  hand, a n d  t e m p t a t i o n  o f  W T O  M e m b e r s  t o  p r o t e c t  d o m e s t i c  
production through internal taxes and regulations on the other. Cases 
involving de facto discrimination against foreign goods will increase in 
number given the sophistication of governments’ protectionist policy. 
T h e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  a  c l a i m  o n  a  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  i n t e r n a l  t a x  
r e q u i r e s  a  m u l t i - t i e r e d  t e s t  o f  s e v e r a l  i s s u e s  i n c l u d i n g  l i k e n e ss, 
discriminatory threshold and protective application of the tax measure. 
This  test  applies  differently  depending  on  what  sentence  of  Article 
III:2  is  at  issue.  The  controversial  “aim-and-effect”  approach  is  not 
relevant  to  the  determination  of  likeness, b u t  c a n  s t i l l  b e  u t i l i z e d , t o  
some  extent,  in  examining  the  protective  application  of  the  measure 
concerned. Some discrepancy in the Appellate Body’s approach to the 
subjective  intent  issue  seems  to  leave  some  room  for  referring  to 
government  statements  in  future  analyses  of  protective  application. 
Korea  and  its  FTA  partners  have  affirmed  their  adherence  to 
G A T T  A r t i c l e  I I I .  W h e n  t h e  F T A  p a r t i e s  e n t e r  i n t o  a  d i s p u t e  o v e r 
national  treatment, a  p r o b l e m  a s  t o  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  W T O  p a n e l s  
over  FTA’s  G A T T - p l u s  p r o v i s i o n s  o n  n a t i o n a l  t r e a t m e n t  m a y  a r i s e .  
I r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  w h a t  d i s p u t e  s e t t l e m e n t  f o r u m  i s  r e s o r t e d  t o ,  GATT- 
plus provisions, as a lex posterior, would prevail over the corresponding provisions of Article III. Another problem is that FTA panels are not 
legally  constrained  by  WTO  jurisprudence.  In  this  regard, i t  i s  
suggested  that  FTA  panels,  wherever  possible,  follow  the  WTO 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  A r t i c l e  I I I  t o  s e c u r e  c o n s i s t e n t  a n d  p r e d i c t able 
application  of  the  national  treatment  rule.
Keywords: Non-discrimination,  National  Treatment,  Internal  Taxation, 
Like  Product,  Directly  Competitive  or  Substitutable  Product 국문요약
본 연구는 GATT  제3조 2항에 규정되어 있는 내국세의 내국민대우
에 대한 것이다.  WTO  출범 이후 2008년 1월 1일 현재까지 제소된 약 
29%의 분쟁은 내국민대우와 관련되어 있다. 이는 한편으로 내국민대우 
원칙이 다자무역제도에서 차지하는 중요성을 나타내며 또 한편으로는 
많은 국가들이 내국세와 국내법규를 통해 국내생산을 보호하고자 하는 
동향을 보여주고 있다. 내국민대우 위반은 주로 두 가지 형태, 즉 법률상
의 차별(de jure discrimination)과 사실상의 차별(de facto discrimination)
로 나타나는데, 향후 외국산 상품에 대한 사실상의 차별과 관련된 사례
가 많아질 것으로 예상된다. 
GATT 제3조 2항과 관련된 차별적 내국세 부과여부 사안을 다룰 때 
동종상품, 차별적 대우 및 보호주의적 적용(protective application)의 여
부를 확인해야 한다.  이러한 3가지 요소의 검토는 GATT  제3조 2항의 
어떤 내용(first  sentence  or  second  sentence)에 위반되느냐에 따라 다
르게 이루어진다. 비록 소위 ‘목적ㆍ효과분석법(‘aim-and-effect’ ap p roach) ’
이 동종상품의 범위를 결정하는 데 적용될 수는 없으나, 내국세의 보호
주의적 적용 여부 확인시에는 이용될 수 있다. 
GATT  제3조는 모든 한국 FTA에 포함되어 있으며 그 협정의 일부
를 구성한다. 하지만 GATT 제3조에 존재하지 않은 내국민대우에 관한 
추가적 내용,  즉 ‘GATT-plus’  규정은 향후 WTO에서 제소대상이 되어 
패널에 의해 판정될 경우에 적용 가능한 법(applicable  law)  문제가 발
생할 수 있다.  이 문제는  ‘신법 우선의 원칙(lex  posterior)’을 바탕으로 
해결할 수 있다.  FTA  패널은 WTO  패널과 상소기관의 판정에 의존할 
의무가 없지만 FTA의 한 구성부분으로서의 GATT  제3조를 일관성 있
게  적용하기 위해 FTA  패널들은 WTO의 해당 평결이나 해석에 따라야 
한다. Sherzod  Shadikhodjaev i s  a n  a s s o c i a t e  r e s e a r c h  f e l l o w  a t  K o r e a  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  
International  Economic  Policy  (KIEP).  He  received  his  PhD  in  law  at  Korea 
University. His recent publications are “Cessation and Reparation in the GATT/WTO 
Legal System: A View from the Law of State Responsibility” (in  co -a u th o rsh ip  w ith 
Nohyoung  Park,  2007),  “The  Equivalence  Standard  in  WTO  Disputes”  (2007), 
“Proposed  Reforms  on  the  WTO’s  Last-Resort  Remedy:  Pros  and  Cons”  (2007), a n d 
“The  Concept  of  ‘WTO  Law’  as  an  Academic  Course”  (2006).
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The principle of non-discrimination which comprises national treatment 
and most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment is an important pillar of the 
multilateral trading system. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has 
separate  disciplines  on  these  two  components  with  respect  to  the 
goods, services and intellectual property sectors. As to trade in goods, 
the  MFN  principle  requires  equal  treatment  of  all  WTO  Members’ 
products,  while  the  national  treatment  rule  precludes  discrimination 
between  domestic  and  imported  products. 
N a t i o n a l  t r e a t m e n t  h a s  a  l o n g  h i s t o r y  d a t i n g  b a c k  t o  a n c i e n t  
H e b r e w  L a w .  I t  w a s  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  v a r i o u s  c o m m e r c i a l  a g r e e m e n t s  
concluded  in  Europe  in  the  Middle  Ages,  in  a  number  of  shipping 
treaties  between  European  countries  in  the  17th  and  18th  centuries, 
and became quite a common part of many trade agreements since the 
late  19th  century.1)  National  treatment  appeared  in  the  Havana 
*  Associate  Research  Fellow  (PhD),  Department  of  Trade  and  Investment 
Policy,  Korea  Institute  for  International  Economic  Policy  (KIEP),  E-mail: 
sherzod1@kiep.go.kr.  The  author  is  grateful  to  Prof.  Jaehyoung  Lee  and 
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Charter  for  an  International  Trade  Organization  and  subsequently  in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, though 
it started to play greater role in restraining protectionism in the 1980s 
w h e n  t r a d e  t a r i f f s  w e r e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  r e d u c e d . 2)
Since  the  WTO  creation  in  1995,  national  treatment  violations  in 
the goods sector have been challenged in 106 out of 369 disputes, i.e. 
nearly 29% of all complaints brought as of 1 January 2008.3) The fact 
that quite a big portion of the WTO complaints has dealt with Article 
III claims may lead to two conclusions. First, it stresses the profound 
importance  of  national  treatment  in  the  multilateral  trading  system. 
Second,  it  reveals  the  temptation  of  WTO  Members  to  protect 
domestic  production  through  internal  taxes  and  regulations  as  their 
importation  regimes  are  becoming  more  liberalized.
National  treatment  has  been  the  subject  of  many  academic 
writings discussing a wide range of issues, such as the “like product” 
standard, t h e  “aim-and-effect” t e s t ,  discriminatory  regulatory  measures, 
the “product-process” doctrine and many others.4) Unlike those studies, 
the purpose of the present paper is to examine the national treatment 
principle as applied to internal taxation only. Taxation is a significant 
economic instrument of each country and is subject to domestic laws 
1)  Trebilcock  (2004), p .  1 .
2)  Ibid., p .  2 .  
3)  See  Appendix. 
4) For instance, the incomplete list of publications on national treatment not 
cited  in  this  paper  includes  e.g.  Srinivasan  (2005),  pp.  69-95; R o e s s l e r  
(2003),  pp.  771-781;  Regan  (2003), p p .  7 3 7 - 7 6 0 ;  Verhoosel  (2002); E h r i n g  
(2001); Hudec (2000), pp. 101-123; Howse and Regan (2000), pp. 249-289; 
Zedalis  (1994),  pp.  33-134.I.  Introduction    11
and regulations. However, GATT Article III:2 as an international rule 
sets  forth  certain  requirements  for  domestic  taxes  so  as  to  ensure 
non-discriminatory  treatment  vis-à-vis f o r e i g n  g o o d s .  I n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  
expanding regionalism in recent years, national treatment is becoming 
important not only on the multilateral, but also regional plane. In this 
respect,  this  paper  supplements  the  existing  literature  with  some 
observations  on  the  application  of  this  principle  in  the  regional 
context,  namely  under  Free  Trade  Agreements  (FTAs)  concluded  by 
the  Korean  government. 
For  the  purpose  of  this  study,  the  paper  will  examine  GATT 
A r t i c l e  I I I : 2  a n d  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  F T A  p r o v i s i o n s .  I n  a d d i t i o n , s u b j e c t -  
related  GATT/WTO  jurisprudence,  preparatory  work  and  critique 
will be referred to in the discussion of legal issues and interpretations.
It is believed that the issue of non-discriminatory internal taxes is 
of  particular  interest  to  policy  makers,  including  legislators  and 
g o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c i a l s  w h o  a r e  i n  c h a r g e  o f  n a t i o n a l  t a x a t i o n .  I n  
addition, a detailed overview and analysis of case law would also be 
h e l p f u l  i n  i d e n t i f y i n g  a n d  c h a l l e n g i n g  a  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y ’s  illegal  tax 
measure  in  the  future.  This  study  would  also  be  useful  to  all  those 
who  are  interested  in  legal  aspects  of  international  trade.   
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  II 
explains general concepts of national treatment, such as de jure and de 
facto  discrimination,  internal  taxes  and  charges, a n d  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
Article  III:2.  Sections  III,  IV  and  V  examine  the  likeness  standard, 
discriminatory  threshold  and  protective  application  of  a  tax  measure 
respectively. Section VI discusses national treatment clauses of Korea 
FTAs,  and  Section  VII  concludes  the  paper. II.  National  Treatment  and  Internal  Taxation: 
General  Observations
G A T T  A r t i c l e  I I I  o n  n a t i o n a l  t r e a t m e n t  t a r g e t s  t w o  t y p e s  o f  
discrimination,  namely:  (1)  tax  discrimination  and  (2)  discrimination 
by  laws,  regulations  or  other  requirements.  In  addition,  paragraph  5 
of the said Article deals with the local content requirement. Paragraph 
2  specifically  addresses  the  issue  of  national  treatment  on  internal 
taxation.  The  sections  bellow  provide  some  general  observations o n  
the  nature  of  discriminatory  treatment,  measures  and  substantive 
issues  covered  by  Article  III:2.
1.  De  Jure  and  De  Facto  Discrimination
An  origin-specific  internal  tax  or  regulation  which  explicitly 
d i s c r i m i n a t e s  a g a i n s t  i m p o r t e d  p r o d u c t s  i s  a  t y p i c a l  e x a m p l e  o f   de 
jure  discrimination.  In  contrast, i n t e r n a l  m e a s u r e s  w h i c h  a r e  f a c i a l l y  
n e u t r a l  b u t  a p p l y  t o  t h e  d i s f a v o r  o f  f o r e i g n  g o o d s  c o n s t i t u t e  de  facto 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  A l t h o u g h  A r t i c l e  I I I  i s  s i l e n t  o n  t h e  de  jure/de  facto 
distinction,  GATT/WTO  case  law  has,  on  a  number  of  occasions, 
recognized  illegality  of  both  types  of  discrimination. 
De  jure  discrimination  on  internal  taxes  took  place  in  the  GATT 
case on Brazil – Internal Taxes, where a Brazilian law of 1948 set forth 
higher  taxes  on  imported  liqueurs  (36  cruzeiros  per  liter)  and  lower 
taxes on domestic liqueurs (18 cruzeiros per liter). The US – Superfund 
case was concerned with a tax on petroleum which was levied at the 
rate of 11.7 cents a barrel on imported products and 8.2 cents a barrel 
o n  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t s .  T h e  s o u r c e - s p e c i f i c  m e a s u r e s  i n  t h e s e  t w o  II.  National  Treatment  and  Internal  Taxation:  General  Observations    13
instances  accorded  less  favorable  treatment  vis-à-vis  imported  goods 
in  violation  of  GATT  Article  III.5) 
Due  to  its  implicit  character,  de  facto  discrimination  against 
imported products is a more challenging aspect of national treatment. 
As John H. Jackson once assumed, the cases of de facto discrimination 
will  increase  in  number, a s  “sophistication  about  GATT  rules  has 
increased among various national officials”.6) Indeed, while mostly de 
jure  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  w a s  t a r g e t e d  i n  G A T T  c a s e s ,  origin-neutral 
measures  have  more  frequently  been  contested  in  WTO  disputes.7) 
The  first  GATT  ruling  which  satisfied  a  complaint  regarding  de  facto 
discrimination  was  adopted  just  in  1987.8) A s  t o  t h e  W T O  p e r i o d , i n  
e.g. Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, the new Chilean tax system, which was 
applicable  as  of  1  December  2000,  charged  all  distilled  spirits  – both 
domestic  and  imported  – with  taxes  based  on  the  degree  of  alcohol 
content. The rate escalated in increments of 4% per additional degree 
o f  a l c o h o l .  T h e  l o w e s t  r a t e  o f  2 7 %  w a s  i m p o s e d  o n  s p i r i t s  w i t h  an 
alcohol  content  of  35°  or  less, w h i l e  t h e  h i g h e s t  r a t e  o f  4 7 %  w a s  s e t  
5) See GATT Working Party Report, Brazilian Internal Taxes, GATT/CP.3/42 
(First Report), adopted 30 June 1949, B ISD  II/181; GATT/CP.5/37 (Second 
Report), a d o p t e d  1 3  D e c e m b e r  1 9 5 0 ,  BISD  II/186;  Hudec  (1990),  pp. 
123-133;  GATT  Panel  Report,  United  States  –  Taxes  on  Petroleum  and 
Certain  Imported  Substances  (US  –  Superfund),  L/6175, a d o p t e d  1 7  J u n e  
1987,  BISD  34S/136,  para.  5.1. 
6)  Jackson  (1989),  p.  212.
7)  Trebilcock,  supra n o t e  1 , p .  4 .  
8) GATT Panel Report, Japan – Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on 
Imported  Wines  and  Alcoholic  Beverages  (Japan  –  Alcoholic  Beverages I), 
L/6216, a d o p t e d  1 0  November 1987,  BISD  34S/83  cited  in  Hudec  (1998), 
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out  for  all  spirits  over  39°.  This  is  a  typical  example  of  an  origin- 
neutral  measure.  Both  the  Panel  and  the  Appellate  Body  confirmed 
discriminatory  treatment  by  Chile’s  measure,  finding  that  about  75% 
of  all  domestic  products  had  an  alcohol  content  of  35°  or  less  and 
thus  taxed  at  the  lowest  rate.9)  
2.  The  Scope  of  Fiscal  Measures
G A T T  A r t i c l e  I I I : 2 ,  first  sentence  requires  non-discrimination 
concerning  “internal  taxes  or  other  internal  charges  of  any  kind”. 
Furthermore, t h e  d r a f t e r s  m a d e  i t  c l e a r  t h a t  e v e n  i f  f i s c a l  m e a s u r e s  
a r e  c o l l e c t e d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  i m p o r t e d  p r o d u c t  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f 
importation,  they  nevertheless  fall  within  the  scope  of  Article  III:2.10) 
T a r i f f s  a n d  o t h e r  c h a r g e s  r e l a t e d  t o  i m p o r t a t i o n  o r  e x p o r t a t i o n  a r e  
n o t  s u b j e c t  t o  t h i s  p r o v i s i o n .  A r t i c l e  I I I : 2  i s  c o n f i n e d  t o  t a x es  on 
products  (indirect  taxes)  including  sales  taxes,  excise  taxes  and 
value-added taxes, and does not apply to direct taxes, such as income 
or  corporate  taxes.11)  Nevertheless,  direct  taxes  may  be  challenged 
9 )  W T O  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y  R e p o r t ,  Chile  –  Taxes  on  Alcoholic  Beverages  (Chile  – 
Alcoholic Beverages), WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R, adopted 12 January 
2000,  paras.  62-76.
1 0 )  A d  A r t i c l e  I I I  o f  t h e  G A T T .
11) During discussions in Sub-Committee A of the Third Committee at the 
Havana  Conference,  it  was  agreed  that  “neither  income  taxes  nor 
import  duties  came  within  the  scope  of  Article  18  [on  national 
treatment]  since  this  Article  refers  specifically  to  internal  taxes  on 
products.”  E/CONF.2/C.3/A/W/32, p p .  1 - 2 , c i t e d  i n  G A T T  ( 1 9 9 5 ) , p .  
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under  Article  III:4.12) 
It  is  noteworthy  that  taxes  for  the  purposes  of  Article  III:2  are 
applied  not  only  “directly”, b u t  a l s o  “indirectly”  to  the  like  product. 
D u r i n g  p r e p a r a t o r y  w o r k  o n  t h e  G A T T  d r a f t i n g ,  it  was  stated  that 
the  word  “indirectly” w o u l d  i n d i c a t e  e v e n  a  t a x  i m p o s e d  n o t  o n  
product  per  se  but  on  the  processing  of  the  product.13)  The  1955 
R e v i e w  W o r k i n g  P a r t y  I I  o n  T a r i f f s , S c h e d u l e s  a n d  C u s t o m s  
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  n o t e d  t h e  d i v e r g e n c e  o f  o p i n i o n  a m o n g  t h e  G A T T  
contracting  parties  as  to  whether  the  national  treatment  principle 
allows taxation of imported products at a rate equivalent to the taxes 
l e v i e d  a t  t h e  v a r i o u s  s t a g e s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  l i k e  d o m e s t i c  
product or only at the rate of the tax levied at the last stage – i.e. on 
the  final  product.  Eventually, i t  r e f r a i n e d  f r o m  r e c o m m e n d i n g  t h e  
insertion  of  an  interpretative  note  on  this  point.14)  Nevertheless, t h e  
G A T T  P a n e l  i n  Japan  – Alcoholic  Beverages  I  appears  to  have  clarified 
Argentina  –  Measures  Affecting  the  Export  of  Bovine  Hides  and  Import  of 
Finished  Leather  (Argentina  –  Hides  and  Leather),  WT/DS155/R, a d o p t e d  
16 February  2001,  para.  11.159  (“…income  taxes,  because  they  are  taxes 
not  normally  directly  levied  on  products,  are  generally  considered  not 
to  be  subject  to  Article III:2.”).
12)  See  WTO  Panel  Report,  United  States  –  Tax  Treatment  for  “Foreign  Sales 
Corporations”  –  Recourse  to  Article  21.5  of  the  DSU  by  the  European 
Communities,  WT/DS108/RW,  adopted  29  January  2002,  paras.  8.142- 
8.146.  For  the  direct  tax  issue,  see  also  Daly  (2005).
13)  UN, E P C T / A / P V / 9 , p .  9 ; E P C T / W / 1 8 1 , p .  3 ,  cited  in  GATT  (1995),  
supra n o t e  1 1 ,  p.  141.
14)  GATT,  Review  Working  Party  II  on  Tariffs,  Schedules  and  Customs 
Administration:  Report  to  the  Contracting  Parties, L / 3 2 9 , 2 4  F e b r u a r y  
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this  issue  by  stating  that:
[I]n assessing whether there is tax discrimination, account is 
to  be  taken  not  only  of  the  rate  of  the  applicable  internal  tax 
but also of the taxation methods (e.g. different kinds of internal 
taxes, direct taxation of the finished product or indirect taxation 
by  taxing  the  raw  materials  used  in  the  product  during  the  various 
stages  of  its  production)  a n d  o f  t h e  r u l e s  f o r  t h e  t a x  c o l l e c t i o n  
(e.g. b a s i s  o f  a s s e s s m e n t ) . 15)  (emphasis  added)
This  passage  seems  to  recognize  taxes  on  foreign  goods  with 
respect  to  various  stages  of  production  provided  that  they  are  not 
less  favorable  compared  to  those  on  domestic  products. 
Fiscal measures covered by Article III:2 consist of both “taxes” and 
“c h a r g e s  o f  a n y  k i n d . ”  With  respect  to  the  latter, t h e  P a n e l  i n  
Argentina  –  Hides  and  Leather f o u n d  t h a t  e v e n  t h e  i n t e r n a l  m e a s u r e  
w h i c h  i s  n o t  a  t a x  a s  s u c h , b u t  a  m e c h a n i s m  f o r  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  
certain  taxes  – a  “tax  administration” m e a s u r e  – can  still  fall  within 
Article  III:2.  In  this  case,  two  government  resolutions  provided  for 
the  imposition  of  charges.  Specifically,  they  imposed  a  pecuniary 
b u r d e n  a n d  c r e a t e d  a  l i a b i l i t y  t o  p a y  m o n e y .  T h e  P a n e l  c o n c l u d e d 
that these resolutions qualified as measures covered by Article III:2. 16) 
I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  i t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  a l l  i n t e r n a l  t a x e s  a r e  set  forth  in 
laws  or  regulations.  When  a  complaining  party  initiates  a  dispute 
settlement procedure over a particular tax measure, it actually challenges 
15) GATT Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages I, supra note 8, para. 5.8.
16)  WTO  Panel  Report,  Argentina  –  Hides  and  Leather,  supra n o t e  1 1 ,  paras. 
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the  law  or  regulation  which  introduces  this  measure.  This  should  be 
differentiated  from  the  case  of  “laws,  regulations  and  requirements” 
covered by Article III:4, as the latter deals with discrimination other than 
tax  discrimination. 
The issue of border tax adjustments is also relevant to Article III:2, 
since it “reflects a desire to equalize domestic tax treatment on goods 
consumed  domestically, w h e t h e r  d o m e s t i c a l l y  p r o d u c e d  o r  i m p o r t e d , 
a n d  a  d e s i r e  t o  r e l i e v e  o t h e r  g o o d s  ( e x p o r t s )  o f  t h a t  b u r d e n . ”17) A  
G A T T  w o r k i n g  p a r t y  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h i s  i s s u e  d e f i n e d  b o r d e r  t a x  
adjustments  as  “any  fiscal  measures  which  put  into  effect, i n  w h o l e  
or  in  part,  the  destination  principle  (i.e. w h i c h  e n a b l e  e x p o r t e d  
products  to  be  relieved  of  some  or  all  of  the  tax  charged  in  the 
exporting  country  in  respect  of  similar  domestic  products  sold  to 
consumers on the home market and which enable imported products 
sold to consumers to be charged with some or all of the tax charged 
in the importing country in respect of similar domestic products).”18) 
A border tax adjustment should be provided on a non-discriminatory 
basis  in  accordance  with  the  national  treatment  rule.  The  working 
party  pointed  to  the  “convergence  of  views” t h a t  o n l y  i n d i r e c t  t a x e s  
a r e  e l i g i b l e  f o r  t a x  a d j u s t m e n t . 19)  In  support, m o s t  o f  t h e  G A T T  
contracting  parties  argued  that  “indirect  taxes  by  their  very  nature 
bear on internal consumption and were consequently levied, according 
to  the  principle  of  destination,  in  the  country  of  consumption, w h i l e  
direct  taxes  –  e v e n  a s s u m i n g  t h a t  t h e y  w e r e  p a r t l y  p a s s e d  o n  i n t o  
17)  Jackson  (1969),  p.  295.
18)  GATT, R e p o r t  o f  t h e  W o r k i n g  P a r t y  o n  B o r d e r  T a x  A d j u s t m e n t s , L /  
3464,  adopted  2  December  1970, p a r a .  4 .
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prices  – w e r e  b o r n e  b y  e n t r e p r e n e u r s ’ p r o f i t s  o r  p e r s o n a l  i n c o m e . ”20)
3.  Multi-Tiered  Test  under  Article  III:2
G A T T  A r t i c l e  I I I : 2  r e a d s :
The  products  of  the  territory  o f  a n y  c o n t r a c t i n g  p a r t y  
imported  into  the  territory  of  any  other  contracting  party  shall 
not  be  subject,  directly  or  indirectly, t o  i n t e r n a l  t a x e s  o r  o t h e r  
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied , directly 
or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting 
party  shall  otherwise  apply  internal  taxes  or  other  internal 
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary 
t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  s e t  f o r t h  i n  p a r a g r a p h  1.*
T h e  a s t e r i s k  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  s e n t e n c e  r e f e r s  t o  a n  
interpretative  note  Ad  Article  III,  paragraph  2  which  provides:
A  tax  conforming  to  the  requirements  of  the  first  sentence 
of paragraph 2 would be considered to be inconsistent with the 
provisions  of  the  second  sentence  only  in  cases  where 
competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed 
product  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  directly  competitive  or 
substitutable  product  which  was  not  similarly  taxed.
The accompanying interpretative note clarifies Article III:2, second 
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sentence, a n d  m u s t  t h u s  b e  r e a d  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  l a t t e r  i n  o r d e r  t o  
ascertain  the  proper  meaning  of  the  provision.21)  In  addition, A r t i c l e  
III:1  which  the  second  sentence  refers  to  states:
The  contracting  parties  recognize  that  internal  taxes  and 
other  internal  charges, a n d  l a w s , r e g u l a t i o n s  a n d  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution  or  use  of  products, a n d  i n t e r n a l  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products 
i n  s p e c i f i e d  a m o u n t s  o r  p r o p o r t i o n s ,  should  not  be  applied  to 
imported  or  domestic  products  so  as  to  afford  protection  to 
domestic  production.
The  two  sentences  of  Article  III:2  are  closely  related  through  the 
same  subject  matter  (national  treatment  on  internal  taxes)  and  the 
words  “moreover” a n d  “otherwise.”  However, t h e  c o n f o r m i t y  o f  a  
c o n t e s t e d  m e a s u r e  w i t h  e i t h e r  o f  t h e s e  s e n t e n c e s  i s  c h e c k e d  o n  the 
b a s i s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  l e g a l  s t a n d a r d s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r , t h e  f i r s t  s e n t e n c e  
r e q u i r e s  a  t w o - t i e r e d  t e s t  o f  ( 1 )  w h e t h e r  t h e  t a x e d  i m p o r t e d  a n d 
domestic products are  “like,” and (2) w hether the taxes applied to the 
imported products are “in excess of” those applied to the like domestic 
products.22) In con tra st ,  the  second  sentence  deals  with  three  issues  of 
whether:  (1) the  imported  and  domestic  products  are  “directly 
competitive or substitutable products” which are in competition with each 
21)  WTO  Appellate Body Report, Japan  – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan  – 
Alcoholic  Beverages  II), W T / D S 8 / A B / R , W T / D S 1 0 / A B / R , W T / D S 1 1 /  
AB/R, a d o p t e d  1  N o v e m b e r  1 9 9 6 ,  p.  24.
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other; ( 2 )  these  products  are  “not  similarly  taxed”; a n d  ( 3 )  the 
dissimilar  taxation  of  the  products  is  “applied  ...  so  as  to  afford 
protection to domestic production.”23) It is for the complaining party to 
establish  a  rebuttable  prima  facie c a s e ,  under  the  first  or  second 
sentence,  with  respect  to  each  covered  issue.24) C o n s e q u e n t l y , o n e  c a n  
point  to  three  elements  of  national  treatment  on  internal  taxation 
which  apply  in  each  sentence  differently:  the  likeness  standard, 
discriminatory  threshold  and  protective  application  of  the  measure. 
Elements Article  III:2,  first  sentence Article  III:2,  second  sentence
Likeness  Standard “like  product”




“in  excess  of”“ not  similarly  taxed”
Protective 
Application
– “so  as  to  afford  protection”
Table  1.  The  Structure  of  Article  III:2
When a WTO Member disputes another Member ’s tax, in a panel 
request it normally indicates what sentence of Article III:2 it believes 
the tax violates. Depending on the product coverage, the complainant 
m a y  r e f e r  t o  t w o  s e n t e n c e s  w h e n  b o t h  l i k e ,  and  directly  competitive 
or  substitutable  products  are  at  issue,  or  either  of  the  sentences. 
23)  Ibid., p .  2 4 .
24)  See  WTO  Panel  Report,  Japan  –  Taxes  on  Alcoholic  Beverages  (Japan  – 
Alcoholic  Beverages  II), W T / D S 8 / R ,  WT/DS10/R,  WT/DS11/R, a d o p t e d  
1 November  1996,  para.  6.14  and  6.28; W T O  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y  R e p o r t , 
Korea  –  Taxes  on  Alcoholic  Beverages  (Korea  –  Alcoholic  Beverages), W T /  
DS75/AB/R, W T / D S 8 4 / A B / R , a d o p t e d  1 7  F e b r u a r y  1 9 9 9 ,  para.  156.II.  National  Treatment  and  Internal  Taxation:  General  Observations    21
Although  in  Korea  – Alcoholic  Beverages, t h e  c l a i m  w a s  r a i s e d  u n d e r  
both  sentences, g i v e n  t h a t  “like  products” a r e  a  s u b s e t  o f  “directly 
competitive  or  substitutable  products,” t h e  P a n e l  f o u n d  i t  “more 
logical”  to  consider  first  the  broader  product  category  under  the 
second  sentence.25) T h i s  “more  logical” a p p r o a c h  i s  n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  
cases where the complainant’s claim is raised under the first sentence 
only.  Accordingly, a  p a n e l  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h i s  c l a i m  s h o u l d  c o n c e n t r a t e  
solely on the first sentence. Otherwise, turning directly to the second 
s e n t e n c e  b a s e d  o n  t h e  a p p r o a c h  a b o v e  w o u l d  b r e a c h  t h e  p a n e l ’s 
mandate.26) 
Under  certain  circumstances, t h e  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y  m a y  c o m p l e t e  
the  panel’s  analysis  of  Article  III:2.  Notably, i n  Canada  – Periodicals, 
the  Panel  found  a  violation  of  Article  III:2,  first  sentence  and  thus 
refused  to  consider  the  US  claim  under  the  second  sentence.  But th e 
Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding on the first sentence and 
w e n t  o n  t o  e x a m i n e  t h e  c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  t h e  m e a s u r e  w i t h  t h e  s e c o nd 
sentence. Despite Canada’s argument that the Appellate Body lacked 
jurisdiction to do so, the Appellate Body responded that it “can, and 
should,  complete  the  analysis  of  Article  III:2” a s  a  “part  of  a  logical 
continuum”  as  two  sentences  are  “closely  related.” I n  EC  – Asbestos, 
the Appellate Body specified several conditions which would allow it 
25) WTO Panel Report, Korea  – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea  – Alcoholic 
Beverages), W T / D S 7 5 / R ,  WT/DS84/R, a d o p t e d  1 7  February  1999,  para. 
10.36.
26) See WTO Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products  (Hormones),  WT/DS26/AB/R, W T / D S 4 8 / A B / R ,  adopted  13 
February  1998,  para.  156  (“P a n e l s  a r e  i n h i b i t e d  f r o m  a d d r e s s i n g  l e g a l  
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to  complete  the  analysis  of  a  panel, s u c h  a s : 27)
(1) Factual findings of the panel and undisputed facts in the panel 
record  should  provide  a  sufficient  basis  for  such  analysis. 
(2) Furthermore, the additional analysis should be “closely related” 
to  the  panel’s  analysis. 
(3) Finally, t h e  r u l e s  t o  b e  e x a m i n e d  i n  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  
should  previously  have  been  interpreted  or  applied  by  panels 
o r  t h e  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y .  
27)  WTO  Appellate  Body  Report,  European  Communities  –  Measures  Affecting 
Asbestos  and  Asbestos-Containing  Products,  WT/DS135/AB/R, a d o p t e d  5  
April  2001,  paras.  78-81.III.  The  Likeness  Standard
Treatment  no  less  favorable  than  that  to  a  domestic  product  is 
a c c o r d e d  t o  s u c h  a n  i m p o r t e d  p r o d u c t  w i t h  w h i c h  i t  s h a r e s  s o m e  
common  features.  In  this  regard, h o w  a l i k e  t h e s e  p r o d u c t s  a r e  i s  a  
matter  of  crucial  importance.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  degree  of 
likeness varies in WTO law. It is even different in different provisions 
o f  G A T T  A r t i c l e  I I I .  P a r a g r a p h  2  o f  t h e  s a i d  A r t i c l e  s p e a k s  o f  “like 
product” a n d  “d i r e c t l y  c o m p e t i t i v e  a n d  s u b s t i t u t a b l e  p r o d u c t .” 
1.  “Like  Product”
The concept of “like product” in the context of international trade 
in  goods  was  originally  inserted  in  the  MFN  clause  of  the  1794  “Jay 
Treaty” b e t w e e n  t h e  U S  a n d  t h e  U K .  S i n c e  t h e n ,  many  bilateral 
a g r e e m e n t s  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  M F N  a n d  n a t i o n a l  t r e a t m e n t  vis-à-vis 
products have used such terms as “same articles,” “same merchandize,” 
“like articles,” “articles of like nature, the growth,” “similar goods” or 
“same  goods.”28)
A s  r e g a r d s  t h e  m u l t i l a t e r a l  t r a d i n g  s y s t e m ,  more  than  50 
provisions under WTO agreements deal with the likeness standard.29) 
The  term  “like  or  similar  products” oc c u r s  s om e  s ixt ee n  tim e s  in  th e 
GATT only.30) At first , the  national treatment provision  as drafted  at 
the  London  Conference  had  been  linked  to  “identical  and  similar 
products.”  In  the  final  version, t h e  r e f e r e n c e  w a s  m a d e  s i m p l y  t o  
28)  See  Choi  (2003),  pp.  158-160.
29)  Ibid., p .  x i .
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“like  products.”  However, t h e  n e g o t i a t i n g  r e c o r d s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  
d r a f t e r s  w a n t e d  t o  s e e  s o m e  f l e x i b l e  w o r d i n g  f o r  t h e  l i k e n e s s  
standard.  This  led  to  the  inclusion  in  1947  of  the  words  “directly 
competitive  or  substitutable.” U n d e r  t h e  p r o p o s e d  t e x t ,  this  standard 
would,  however, a p p l y  o n l y  i f  “there  is  no  substantial  domestic 
production  of  like  products  of  national  origin.”  Ad  Article  III 
introduced in 1948 excluded the prerequisite of  “substantial domestic 
production” ensuring broader applicability of the category of “directly 
competitive  or  substitutable” p r o d u c t s . 31)
G A T T A r tic l e II I doe s  n o t def in e  t h e  te r m  “like  product.” Neither 
d o e s  c a s e  l a w  g i v e  a  u n i f o r m  d e f i n i t i o n .  I n  f a c t ,  the  Appellate  Body 
c o m p a r e d  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  l i k e n e s s  t o  a n  a c c o r d i o n  w h i c h  “stretches 
and  squeezes” d e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  i n  w h i c h  t h i s  c o n c e p t  
appears  as  well  as  the  specific  circumstances  of  each  individual  case 
where  this  provision  is  invoked.32)  Accordingly,  imported  and 
domestic products do not need to be identical in all respects in order 
to  be  “like.”  Nevertheless, t h e  d e g r e e  o f  l i k e n e s s  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  c e r t a i n  
limitations imposed by relevant rules. As regards the first sentence of 
Article  III:2, t h e  t e r m  “like  product” s h o u l d  b e  c o n s t r u e d  n a r r o w l y , 
whereas  how  narrowly  is  a  matter  that  is  determined  for  each  tax 
measure separately.33) For instance, while the Panel in the GATT case 
on  Japan  – Alcoholic  Beverages  I h a d  q u a l i f i e d  a s  “like  products” t h e  
goods which shared similar qualities or served substantially identical 
end-uses,  the  Panel  and  the  Appellate  Body  in  the  WTO  case  on 
31)  See  Choi,  supra  note  28,  pp.  107-108.
32) WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 21, 
pp.  21-22.
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Japan  – Alcoholic  Beverages  II  interpreted  this  term  more  narrowly  by 
stressing  substantially  the  same  physical  characteristics.34)
The “like product” standard has been construed based on numerous 
criteria.  Referring  to  the  1970  Working  Party  Report  on  “Border  Tax 
Adjustments,” t h e  a d j u d i c a t o r y  b o d i e s  h a v e  m a i n l y  r e l i e d  o n  ( 1 )  t h e  
product’s  end-uses  in  a  given  market; ( 2 )  c o n s u m e r s ’  tastes  and 
habits; a n d  ( 3 )  t h e  p r o d u c t ’s  properties,  nature  and  quality.35) T h i s  
approach has been followed in almost all adopted panel reports.36) In 
addition,  the  Appellate  Body  in  Japan-Alcoholic  Beverages  II  also 
acknowledged the relevance of the product’s tariff classification based 
on  the  Harmonized  System  (HS).  On  the  other  hand,  it  doubted  the 
reliability  of  tariff  bindings  which  “include  broad  ranges  of  products 
t h a t  c u t  a c r o s s  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  H S  t a r i f f  h e a d i n g s . ”  Only  tariff 
b i n d i n g s  w h i c h  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  p r e c i s e  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  p r o d u c t  
description  may  provide  some  “significant  guidance” f o r  t h e  l i k e n e s s  
test.37) The suggested criteria are by no means an exhaustive list and 
s h o u l d  b e  a p p l i e d  o n  a  c a s e - b y - c a s e  b a s i s  t a k i n g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t he 
particularities  of  each  case  context.  As  to  the  process  or  production 
method  (PPM)  by  which  a  product  is  made, i t  i s  n o t  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  
likeness  test, s i n c e  t h e  n a t i o n a l  t r e a t m e n t  o b l i g a t i o n  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  I I I  
is confined to measures which apply to or affect the product as such. 38) 
Accordingly, t w o  p r o d u c t s  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  c r i t e r i a  a b o v e  c a n n o t  b e  
34)  See  Zhou  (2007),  pp.  11-12.
35)  GATT,  L/3464,  supra  note  18,  para.  18. 
36) WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 21, 
p.  20.
37)  Ibid., p .  2 2 .
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qualified  as  not  “like” m e r e l y  o n  t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e i r  P P M s  a r e  
different.
The  likeness  test  requires  a  comparison  between  an  imported 
product  and  a  domestic  product.  However,  discriminatory  treatment 
m a y  b e  f o u n d  e v e n  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a c t u a l  i m p o r t s .  T h e  r e a s o n  is 
that the rationale for the Article III obligation is to protect expectations 
o f  t h e  M e m b e r s  a s  t o  t h e  c o m p e t i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e i r  
products and those of other Members. 39) In the Indonesia – Autos case 
on an origin-based distinction with respect to internal taxes, the Panel 
found  that  such  distinction  “suffices  in  itself  to  violate  Article  III:2, 
without the need to demonstrate the existence of actually traded like 
products.”40) I n  t h e  Canada  – Periodicals c a s e , t h e  Pa n e l to ok  o n e  s t ep  
further  comparing  domestic  and  hypothetical  imported  goods.  The 
Panel considered whether imported split-run periodicals and domestic 
non-split-run  periodicals  were  like  products.  The  measure  at  issue 
was a prohibitive tax on advertising revenues from Canadian edition 
of  split-run  periodicals,  i.e.  periodicals  produced  for  the  Canadian 
market  and  containing  advertisements  directed  at  this  market  and 
additional pages for local editorial content. As there were no imports 
of split-run editions because of the import prohibition in Tariff Code 
9958, w h i c h  w a s  f o u n d  t o  b e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  G A T T  A r t i c l e  X I , 
39)  GATT  Panel  Report,  US  –  Superfund,  supra n o t e  5 , p a r a .  5 . 2 . 2 ; W T O  
Appellate  Body  Report,  India  –  Patent  Protection  for  Pharmaceutical  and 
Agricultural  Chemical  Products, W T / D S 5 0 / A B / R ,  adopted  16  January 
1998,  para.  36.
40)  WTO  Panel  Report,  Indonesia  –  Certain  Measures  Affecting  the  Automobile 
Industry  (Indonesia  –  Autos), W T / D S 5 4 / R ,  WT/DS55/R, W T / D S 5 9 / R , 
WT/DS64/R, a d o p t e d  2 3  J u l y  1 9 9 8 ,  para.  14.113.III.  The  Likeness  Standard    27
hypothetical  imports  of  split-run  periodicals  were  considered.  The 
Appellate  Body  recognized  the  possibility  of  using  hypothetical 
i m p o r t s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  a  m e a s u r e  v i o l a t e s  A r t i c l e  III:2, b u t  i t  
rejected  the  hypothetical  example  used  by  the  Panel.41) 
2.  “Directly  Competitive  or  Substitutable  Products”
Even  if  an  imported  product  is  not  a  “like  product”  within  the 
meaning  of  Article  III:2, f i r s t  s e n t e n c e ,  it  can  still  be  eligible  for 
national  treatment  vis-à-vis  a  directly  competitive  or  substitutable 
d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t .  T h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e  f o r  e.g. p r o d u c t s  w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  
origins, c o n t e n t s  a n d  t a r i f f  r a t e s  b u t  c o m p e t i t i v e  i n  t e r m s  o f  p r i c e  o r  
substitutable  in  terms  of  their  end-use, s u c h  a s  a p p l e s  a n d  o r a n g e s , 
o r  s k i m m e d  m i l k  a n d  v e g e t a b l e  p r o t e i n  p r o d u c t s . 42)  On  the  other 
hand, the “directly competitive or substitutable” standard is applicable 
even  if  an  imported  product  has  a  domestic  “like” c o u n t e r p a r t .  
S u p p o s e  M e m b e r  A  l e v i e s  a  s a l e s  t a x  o f  5 0 %  o n  a p p l e s  a n d  5 %  o n  
pears  without  distinguishing  their  origin.  The  tax  in  question  fully 
conforms  to  Article  III:2, f i r s t  s e n t e n c e  b e c a u s e  i t  e q u a l l y  t r e a t s  l i k e  
products,  i.e.  domestic  and  imported  apples, a n d  d o m e s t i c  a n d  
imported  pears.  But  Member  B, t h e  m a i n  e x p o r t e r  o f  a p p l e s  t o  
Member  A, c a n  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  5 0 %  t a x  u n d e r  A r t i c l e  I I I ,  second 
sentence on the grounds that apples and pears are directly competitive 
41)  WTO  Panel  Report,  Canada  –  Certain  Measures  Concerning  Periodicals, 
WT/DS31/R,  adopted  30  July  1997,  paras.  5.22-5.26; W T O  A p p e l l a t e  
Body  Report,  Canada  –  Certain  Measures  Concerning  Periodicals  (Canada  – 
Periodicals), W T / D S 3 1 / A B / R , a d o p t e d  3 0  J u l y  1 9 9 7 ,  pp.  20-22.
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and substitutable, as this tax has provoked a decrease of consumption 
of  apples  and  a  simultaneous  increase  of  consumption  of  pears  in 
Member A. Indeed, Ad Article III, paragraph 2 provides a legal basis 
f o r  s u c h  a n  a l l e g a t i o n  b y  s t i p u l a t i n g  t h a t  a  t a x  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  the 
f i r s t  s e n t e n c e  m a y  b e  f o u n d  i n  b r e a c h  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  s e n t e n c e .  
Two  products  are  “competitive  or  substitutable” i f  t h e y  a r e  
interchangeable  or  offer  “alternative  ways  of  satisfying  a  particular 
need or taste.”43) The words “competitive or substitutable” are preceded 
with  the  word  “directly” w h i c h  n a r r o w s  t h e  s c o p e  o f  c o m p e t i t i v e /  
substitutable products. Accordingly, indirectly competitive or substitutable 
products  do  not  fall  within  Article  III:2,  second  sentence.  It  is 
understood  that  the  word  “directly” r e f e r s  t o  b o t h  “competitive” ( i.e. 
“directly competitive”) and “substitutable” (i.e. “directly substitutable”). 
Although adjudicatory bodies normally examine the product coverage 
in the single “competitive/substitutable” category, the word “competitive” 
is used from a producer ’s perspective while  “substitutable” is a term 
used  from  the  consumer’s  point  of  view.44) 
The notion of  “directly competitive or substitutable products” is a 
broader concept than that of “like product.” The scope of “broadness” 
is a matter for a panel to determine in each particular case based on 
the relevant factors.45) Furthermore , according to the Appellate Body, 
while  perfectly  substitutable  products  fall  within  Article  III:2, f i r s t  
sentence, i m p e r f e c t l y  s u b s t i t u t a b l e  p r o d u c t s  c a n  b e  a s s e s s e d  u n d e r  
Article III:2,  second  sentence.46)  Unfortunately,  the  Appellate  Body 
43)  WTO  Appellate  Body  Report,  Korea  –  Alcoholic  Beverages,  supra n o t e  2 4 , 
para.  115.
44)  For  details,  see  Choi  (2003),  supra  note  28,  pp.  14-17.
45) WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 21, p. 25.III.  The  Likeness  Standard    29
has not elaborated on the “(im)perfectly” criterion, nor has it provided 
a  s e n s i b l e  r e a s o n i n g  f o r  i t s  d e c i s i o n  t o  d i f f e r e n t l y  t r e a t  p e r f ectly  and 
imperfectly substitutable products under the two sentences. It appears 
that the term “perfectly substitutable” is absolute, that is all perfectly 
substitutable  products  are  “like”  in  the  sense  of  the  first  sentence.  In 
contrast,  not  all  imperfectly  substitutable  products  fall  within  the 
second  sentence, a s  t h e y  m u s t  b e  directly  substitutable.  This  is 
probably  why  the  Appellate  Body  stated  that  these  products  “can b e  
assessed” u n d e r  t h e  s e c o n d  s e n t e n c e . 47) 
Article  III:2, s e c o n d  s e n te n c e  in v o lv e s  a n  e x a m in a tio n  o f  c o m p e titiv e 
conditions  in  the  relevant  market.  In  addition  to  the  basic  criteria  of 
“like  product” ( p h y s i c a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  common  end-uses, c o n s u m e r s ’ 
tastes and habits, and tariff classifications), several other factors may be 
examined.  These  factors  include  but  are  not  limited  to  the  cross-price 
elasticity,  advertising  activities  or  channels  of  distribution.48)  
A comparison of imported and directly competitive or substitutable 
domestic  products  is  normally  carried  out  on  an  item-to-item  basis 
when  each  imported  product  is  compared  to  a  domestic  product 
concerned. However, in Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, the Panel grouped 
46)  WTO  Appellate  Body  Report,  Canada  – Periodicals,  supra n o t e  4 1 , p .  2 8 ; 
WTO  Appellate  Body  Report,  Korea  – Alcoholic  Beverages,  supra n o t e  2 4 , 
para. 118. For a critique of the “perfectly substitutable” criterion, see also 
이재형 (2002), p p .  1 9 - 2 0.
47)  WTO  Appellate Body Report, Korea  – Alcoholic  Beverages, ibid.,  para.  118, 
emphasis  added.
48) See WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 
21, p .  2 5 ;  WTO  Panel  Report,  Korea  –  Alcoholic  Beverages,  supra n o t e  2 5 , 
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together  all  of  the  imported  products  and  compared  this  group  with 
Korean  alcoholic  beverage  called  “soju.”  The  Appellate  Body  found 
this approach appropriate, because the grouping of imported products 
was  an  “analytical  tool” t o  m i n i m i z e  r e p e t i t i o n  i n  t h i s  c o m p a r i s o n , 
and  the  Panel  took  account  of  individual  product  characteristics 
where  appropriate.49) T h e  s a m e  r a t i o n a l e  m a y  b e  a p p l i e d  i n  t h e  
likeness test under Article III:2, first sentence. While a proper grouping 
of imported products is acceptable, the omission of some products in 
the Article III analysis is not allowed. The Appellate Body in Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages II found that the Panel erred in law in limiting its 
conclusions  to  some  beverages  only  (“shochu, w h i s k y , b r a n d y , r u m , 
gin,  genever,  and  liqueurs”)  while  the  range  of  products  mentioned 
i n  t h e  p a n e l  r e q u e s t  ( “all  other  distilled  spirits  and  liqueurs  falling 
within  HS  heading  2208”)  was  broader.50) 
3.  The  “Aim-and-Effect” T e s t  
I n  c e r t a i n  c a s e s , G A T T  p a n e l s  d e v e l o p e d  t h e  s o  c a l l e d  “aim-and- 
effect” t e s t  w h i c h  p r o d u c e d  a d d i t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s  f o r  a  l i k e n e s s  
determination. The proposed approach examined whether a contested 
measure  has  the  protectionist  intent  and  effect.  In  US  –  Malt 
Beverages,  the  Panel  examined  Canada’s  claim  that  the  state  of 
Mississippi applied, contrary to Article III, a lower tax to wines made 
from a certain variety of grape growing only in the Southeastern US 
49)  WTO  Appellate  Body  Report,  Korea  –  Alcoholic  Beverages,  supra n o t e  2 4 , 
paras.  139-145.
50) WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 21, 
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and  the  Mediterranean  and  thus  discriminated  against  Canada’s 
“like” products, and that some US states differentiated between beers 
b a s e d  o n  t h e i r  a l c o h o l  c o n t e n t s .  T h e  m o s t  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  a s p e c t  of  the 
Panel’s  f i n d i n g s  w a s  t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e g u l a t o r y  p u r p o s e  o f  
the measure in the context of the likeness determination. In particular, 
the  Panel  stated:
Specifically,  the  purpose  of  Article  III  is  not  to  prevent 
contracting parties from differentiating between different product 
c a t e g o r i e s  f o r  p o l i c y  p u r p o s e s  u nrelated  to  the  protection  of 
domestic production. […] [T]he limited purpose of Article III has 
to be taken into account in interpreting the term “like products” 
i n  t h i s  A r t i c l e .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  in  determining  whether  two 
products  subject  to  different  treatment  are  like  products, i t  i s  
necessary  to  consider  whether  such  product  differentiation  is 
being made “so as to afford protection to domestic production.”51)
The “aim-and-effect” approach was further followed in the unadopted 
GATT  report  on  US  – Taxes  on  Automobiles.  The  EC’s  complaint  was 
m a i n l y  a b o u t  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  b y  t h e  U S  o f  a  l u x u r y  e x c i s e  t a x  a n d 
g a s - g u z z l e r  t a x  o n  d o m e s t i c  a n d  i m p o r t e d  a u t o m o b i l e s  o n  t h e  b a s is 
o f  t h e i r  v a l u e  a n d  g a s o l i n e  c o n s u m p t i o n  p e r  m i l e .  A c c o r d i n g  t o  the 
EC, t h e s e  m e a s u r e s  i m p o s e d  h e a v i e r  b u r d e n  o n  l a r g e r  a n d  m o r e  
expensive  automobiles  that  were  predominantly  represented  by 
E u r o p e a n  c a r s .  T h e  U S  c o n t e n d e d  t h a t  t h e  k e y  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  l i k e ness 
51) GATT Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt 
Beverages  (US  –  Malt  Beverages), D S 2 3 / R ,  adopted  19  June  1992, B I S D  
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determination was whether the measure was applied “so as to afford 
protection to domestic industry.” The Panel ruled in favor of the US, 
f i n d i n g  t h a t  t h e  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  w a s  n o t  i m p l e m e n t e d  f o r  the 
protectionist  purpose  and  thus  despite  their  physical  similarities  the 
cars  at is sue wer e n ot like pr oducts  in  the sen se of Article III:2, first 
sentence.52)  With  respect  to  the  EC’s  argument  that  statements  by 
legislators  pointed  out  the  protectionist  nature  of  the  measure, t h e  
Panel  held  that:
[ A ] n  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  a i m  o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  c o u l d  n o t  b e  
based solely on such statements or on other preparatory work. 
T h e  a i m  o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  h a d  a l s o  t o  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  t h r o u g h  
the interpretation of the wording of the legislation as a whole.53)
This  passage  suggests  that  although  the  demonstration  of  a 
subjective intent by legislators is not irrelevant for the likeness test, it 
is still not sufficient, so the evidence should be inferred from the text 
of the legislation. The Appellate Body provided some support for this 
standpoint  in  Chile  – Alcoholic  Beverages.54)
In  Japan  – Alcoholic  Beverages  II, b o t h  J a p a n  a n d  t h e  U S  t o o k  t h e  
view  that  Article  III:2, f i r s t  s e n t e n c e  r e q u i r e s  a n  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  
aim  and  effect  of  the  contested  legislation.  The  Panel  rejected t h e i r  
arguments  and  considered  that  while  the  effect  of  a  particular 
measure  is  generally  discernible, t h e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  i t s  a i m  i s  v e r y  
52)  GATT  Panel  Report,  United  States  –  Taxes  on  Automobiles, D S 3 1 / R , 1 1  
October  1994, u n a d o p t e d ,  paras.  5.11-5.15, a n d  5 . 2 1 - 5 . 3 6 .
53)  Ibid., p a r a .  5 . 1 2 .
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dif f ic u lt a s th e a im  i s so m e tim e s  “indiscernible.” B e c a u s e  a  c o n t e s t e d  
measure  may  have  multiple  aims, i t  c o u l d  b e  p r o b l e m a t i c  t o  s h o w  
which aim is relevant for the “aim-and-effect” test. It is also not clear 
what  kind  of  evidence  would  be  pertinent.  In  addition,  the  list  of 
exceptions in GATT Article XX could become redundant or useless if 
t h e  a i m s  s p e c i f i e d  t h e r e  w e r e  c o n s i d e r e d  u n d e r  t h e  A r t i c l e  I I I  
analysis. Specifically, if adjudicatory bodies were required to consider 
t h e  a i m  o f  t h e  m e a s u r e  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  A r t i c l e  I I I ,  “all  of  the 
regulatory  justifications  provided  in  Article  XX  would  already  have 
been  considered  and  disposed  of  in  the  first-stage  determination  of 
violation, leaving no reason to conduct the same inquiry again under 
Article  XX.”55) W h i l e  r e c o g n i z i n g  t h a t  t h e  “aim-and-effect” t e s t  w a s  
u t i l i z e d  b y  G A T T  p a n e l s  i n  t w o  c a s e s , t h e  P a n e l  i n  Japan  – Alcoholic 
Beverages  II  could  not  find  any  textual  justification  for  this  approach 
under  Article  III:2, f i r s t  s e n t e n c e . 56)  The  Appellate  Body  upheld  the 
Panel’s  conclusion  on  this  issue.57) 
Despite the rejection of the “aim-and-effect” test in WTO jurisprudence, 
Robert E. Hudec suggested that it offers two “principal improvements” 
t o  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s :  
First,  it  consigned  the  metaphysics  of  “likeness” t o  a  l e s s e r  
role in the analysis, and instead made the question of violation 
d e p e n d  p r i m a r i l y  o n  t h e  t w o  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  i s s u e s  t h a t  
55)  Hudec,  supra  note  8,  pp.  628-629.
56)  WTO  Panel  Report,  Japan  –  Alcoholic  Beverages  II,  supra n o t e  2 4 ,  paras. 
6.16-6.18.
57) WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 21, 
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separate bona fide regulation from trade protection – the trade 
effects  of  the  measure, a n d  t h e  b o n a  f i d e s  o f  t h e  a l l e g e d  
regulatory purpose behind it. Second, by making it possible for 
the  issue  of  regulatory  justification  to  be  considered  at  the 
s a m e ti m e th e  i s s u e o f vio la t io n  it s e lf  is  be in g  det er m in ed , th e  
“aim  and  effects”  approach  avoided  both  the  premature 
d i s m i s s a l  o f  v a l i d  c o m p l a i n t s  o n  g r o u n d s  o f  “un-likeness” 
alone, a n d  e x c e s s i v e l y  r i g o r o u s  t r e a t m e n t  g i v e n  t o  c l a i m s  o f  
regulatory  justification  under  Article  XX  whenever  the  two 
products  were  ruled  “like.”58)
The “aim-and-effect” test could be said to be useful at least in the 
context  of  de  facto  discrimination.  The  proposition  is  that  unlike  the 
case of an origin-specific measure which arguably does not require a 
thorough  likeness  analysis,  the  case  of  the  origin-neutral  measure 
requires a “substantive inquiry into the relevant meaning of ‘likeness’” 
which may include the “aim-and-effect” test.59) This thesis is controversial 
58)  Hudec,  supra  note  8,  p.  628.
59)  For  example,  Donald  H.  Regan  states  that:
[ I ] n  o r d e r  t o  d e c i d e  w h e t h e r  p r o d u c t s  w h i c h  a r e  t r e a t e d  
differently  by  an  origin-neutral  measure  are  “like,”  we  must 
first find some specific content for “likeness.” We must decide 
w h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  r e l e v a n t .  B u t  i t  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  
w e  c a n  s k i p  o v e r  t h a t  s t e p  w h e n  w e  a r e  d e a l i n g  w i t h  a n  
origin-specific  measure.  The  reason  is  that  an  origin-specific 
measure treats differently (or is potentially capable of treating 
d i f f e r e n t l y )  p r o d u c t s  t h a t  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  i n  e v e r y  r e s p e c t  e x c e p t 
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because there is no formal distinction of de jure/de facto discrimination 
in  Article  III,  and  GATT/WTO  jurisprudence  does  not  seem  to 
i n d i c a t e  d i f f e r e n t  l i k e n e s s  s t a n dards  based  solely  on  this  distinction. 
Without  going  into  all  details  of  the  “aim-and-effect” d e b a t e , t h i s  
paper concludes that according to  the WTO  practice the approach i n 
question  is  still  relevant,  to  some  extent,  to  Article  III:2, s e c o n d  
sentence  with  respect  to  “s o  a s  t o  a f f o r d  p r o t e c t i o n ”  – a  stage  which 
i s  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  a n d  s e p a r a t e  f r o m  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  l i k e n e ss. 
respect  except  for  their  origin  must  be  “like”  whatever  the 
s p e c i f i c  c o n t e n t  o f  “likeness”  in  the  context. 
Regan  (2002),  pp.  455-456.  See  also, p .  4 7 4  ( “It  remains  true  that  in 
dealing with an origin-neutral measure such as the measure involved in 
Japan  –  Alcohol, w e  m u s t  s o m e h o w  a t t e n d  t o  t h e  ‘so  as  to  afford 
protection’ policy, even under Article III:2, first sentence. If there is no 
separate  step,  then  the  ‘s o  a s  t o  a f f o r d  p r o t e c t i o n ’ p o l i c y  m u s t  b e  p a r t  
o f  t h e  i n q u i r y  i n t o  ‘likeness.’”).   IV.  Discriminatory  Threshold
O n c e  t h e  l i k e n e s s  s t a n d a r d  i s  m e t , t h e  n e x t  s t e p  i s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
whether  the  product  at  issue  has  (not)  been  discriminated  against. 
W i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  i n t e r n a l  t a x a t i o n , u n e q u a l  t r e a t m e n t  o f  d o m e s t i c  a n d  
imported products normally takes the form of imposing different tax 
r a t e s .  T h i s  a l s o  i n c l u d e s  s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t s  a r e 
granted  exemption  or  remission  of  taxes  while  like  or  directly 
competitive/substitutable  imported  products  are  not.  In  1950, t h e  
Netherlands  filed  a  complaint  about  the  “utility” s y s t e m  o f  t h e  U K  
which  exempted  from  a  purchase  tax  some  domestic  products.  Two 
years later, the UK notified that such tax exemption was extended to 
imported  products.60) I n  Canada  –  Gold  Coins, S o u t h  A f r i c a  r a i s e d  a  
claim that an exemption of Canadian gold coins from retail sales tax 
was  a  violation  of  national  treatment.  The  Panel  found  that  the t a x  
imposed on South African gold coins was in excess of that applied to 
a  like  domestic  product.61) 
Under  certain  circumstances,  tax  breaks  may  be  qualified  as  a 
“subsidy” w i t h i n  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  t h e  A g r e e m e n t  o n  S u b s i d i e s  a n d  
C o u n t e r v a i l i n g  M e a s u r e s  ( S C M  A g r e e m e n t ) .  R e g a r d i n g  t h e  s u b s i d y  
issue,  GATT  Article  III:8(b)  provides:
The  provisions of  this Article  shall not prevent  the payment 
of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including payments 
to  domestic  producers  derived  from  the  proceeds  of  internal 
60)  GATT  Analytical  Index,  supra n o t e  1 1 ,  p.  152.
61)  GATT  Panel  Report,  Canada  –  Measures  Affecting  the  Sale  of  Gold  Coins, 
L/5863,  17  September  1985, u n a d o p t e d ,  para.  51.IV.  Discriminatory  Threshold    37
taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this 
Article  and  subsidies  effected  through  governmental  purchases 
of  domestic  products.
I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  n o t  a l l  s u b s i d i e s  a r e  e x e m p t e d  f r o m 
the  national  treatment  rule.  First, t h e  w o r d s  “the  payment  of 
subsidies” point to direct subsidies involving actual payments, i.e. not 
tax  credits  or  tax  breaks.  Moreover, t h e  “payments  to  domestic 
producers  derived  from  the  proceeds  of  internal  taxes  or  charges” 
refer to payments made after taxes have been collected. 62) Second, the 
passage  above  refers  to  the  subsidies  which  are  paid  exclusively  to 
domestic  producers,  rather  than  products.  The  word  “exclusively” 
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a  p a y m e n t  m u s t  b e  m a d e  solely a n d  directly t o  
producers.63) T o  p u t  i t  d i f f e r e n t l y , t h e  p r o v i s i o n  i n  q u e s t i o n  i s  a b o u t  
producer subsidies. In e.g. EEC – Oilseeds I, a subsidy to processors of 
oilseeds  was  conditional  upon  purchase  of  domestic  oilseeds, t h u s  i t  
provided indirect incentives for oilseed producers. The Panel did not 
c o n s i d e r  t h e  s u b s i d y  a s  a n  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  t r e a t m e n t  rule 
b e c a u s e  i t  w a s  n o t  p a i d  d i r e c t l y  t o  t h e  p r o d u c e r s  o f  o i l s e e d s .  
Moreover, this subsidy benefited not only the producers, but also the 
processors  of  oilseeds.64)  Since  Article  III:8(b)  subsidies  are  allocated 
to  producers, a  r e d u c t i o n  o r  e x e m p t i o n  o f  t a x e s  o n  a  product i s  n o t  a  
62)  GATT  Panel  Report,  US  –  Malt  Beverages,  supra n o t e  5 1 ,  para.  5.8.
63)  GATT  Panel  Report,  European  Economic  Community  –  Payments  and 
Subsidies  Paid  to  Processors  and  Producers  of  Oilseeds  and  Related  Animal- 
Feed  Proteins,  L/6627,  adopted  25  January  1990,  BISD  37S/86,  paras. 
136-137.
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“subsidy”  in  the  sense  of  this  provision, a n d  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  
requirements  of  Article  III.65) 
Article  III:8(b)  is  without  pre j u d i c e  t o  t h e  S C M  A g r e e m e n t . 66) 
T h u s ,  s u b s i d i e s  a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  a r e  s u b ject  to 
provisions of the SCM Agreement irrespective of whether they violate 
o r  n o t  G A T T  A r t i c l e  I I I .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e  o b l i g a t i o n s  u n d e r  t h e  n a t ional 
treatment and subsidy disciplines are different and complementary, so that 
even subsidies to producers are subject to the provisions of Article III 
when  they  discriminate  between  imported  and  domestic  products.67) 
I n  d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  a  t a x  m e a s u r e  d i s c r i m i n a t e s  a g a i n s t  
foreign  goods, i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  s e t  t h e  b o u n d a r i e s  o f  l a t i t u d e  w i t h i n  
which differential treatment is permissible. A threshold beyond which 
any  Member’s  action  would  be  inconsistent  with  Article  III:2  is 
reflected  in  the  words  “in  excess  of”  (the  first  sentence)  or  “not 
6 5 )  A t  l e a s t  f o u r  G A T T  p a n e l  r e p o r t s  c i t e d  b y  t h e  U S  s u p p o r t  t h is 
proposition.  See  WTO  Appellate  Body  Report,  Canada  –  Periodicals, 
supra n o t e  4 1 , p .  3 3 .
66)  See  Interim  Commission  for  the  International  Trade  Organization, 
R e p o r t s  o f  t h e  C o m m i t t e e s  a n d  P r i n c i p a l  S u b - C o m m i t t e e s :  I C I T O  I /8, 
Geneva,  September  1948, p .  6 6 , c i t e d  i n  W T O  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y  R e p o r t , 
ibid., p .  3 4 .  
T h i s  s u b - p a r a g r a p h  w a s  r e d r a f t e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  m a k e  i t  c l e a r  t h a t  
nothing  in  Article  18  [on  national  treatment]  could  be  construed  to 
s a n c t i o n  t h e  e x e m p t i o n  o f  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t s  f r o m  i n t e r n a l  t a x e s  
imposed on like imported products or the remission of such taxes. At 
the  same  time  the  Sub-Committee  r e c o r d e d  i t s  v i e w  t h a t  n o t h i n g  in 
t h i s  s u b - p a r a g r a p h  o r  e l s e w h e r e  i n  A r t i c l e  1 8  w o u l d  o v e r r i d e  t h e 
provisions  of  Section  C  of  Chapter  IV  [on  subsidies].
67)  WTO  Panel  Report,  Indonesia  –  Autos,  supra n o t e  4 0 ,  para.  14.45.IV.  Discriminatory  Threshold    39
similarly  taxed.”  (the  second  sentence)
1.  “In  Excess  of”
Discrimination  under  Article  III:2,  first  sentence  exists  when 
internal  taxes  or  charges  on  imported  products  are  “in  excess  of” 
those  on  like  domestic  products.  In  Japan  – Alcoholic  Beverages  II, t h e  
Appellate  Body  held  that  even  the  smallest  amount  of  “excess”  – de 
minimis  – is  too  much,  thus  not  allowed  in  this  context.68) T o  p u t  i t  
differently, t h e  p e r m i s s i b l e  l e v e l  o f  b u r d e n  f r o m  f i s c a l  m e a s u r e s  
i m p o s e d  o n  i m p o r t e d  g o o d s  i s  e i t h e r  t h e  s a m e  a s  o r  l o w e r  t h a n  t he 
t a x  b u r d e n  b o r n e  b y  d o m e s t i c  l i k e  p r o d u c t s .   
T h e  c o m p a r i s o n  o f  f i s c a l  m e a s u r e s  o n  i m p o r t e d  a n d  d o m e s t i c  
p r o d u c t s  i s  n o t  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  a p p l i c a b l e  t a x  r a t e s  o n l y .  E v e n  equal 
t a x  r a t e s  m a y  i m p o s e  d i f f e r e n t  t a x  b u r d e n  o n  t h e  p r o d u c t s  i n  
question, f o r  e x a m p l e ,  when  different  methods  of  computing  tax 
bases  are  employed.  Should  imported  goods  be  faced  with  heavier 
tax  burden,  the  rule  of  national  treatment  is  violated.  Thus, A r t i c l e  
III:2, first sentence requires a comparison of actual tax burdens rather 
t h a n  m e r e l y  o f  n o m i n a l  t a x  b u r d e n s . 69) M o r e o v e r ,  national  treatment 
i s  t o  b e  a c c o r d e d  t o  e a c h  i n d i v i d u a l  i m p o r t  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o n c e r n ed, 
and  to  be  evaluated  on  a  transaction-to-transaction  basis.  For 
example, i n  Argentina  –  Hides  and  Leather, t h e  t a x  r a t e  o f  3 %  f o r  
imports  as  compared  to  corresponding  tax  rates  of  2%  or  4%  for 
68) WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 21, 
p.  23.
69)  WTO  Panel  Report,  Argentina  –  Hides  and  Leather,  supra n o t e  1 1 ,  paras. 
11.182-11.184.40    National  Treatment  on  Internal  Taxation:  Revisiting  GATT  Article  III:2
internal sales was found inconsistent with Article III:2 , first sentence. 
Although  the  burden  on  imports  was  lower  in  some  cases  (3%  vs. 
4%), i t  w a s  h i g h e r  i n  o t h e r s  ( 3 %  v s .  2 % ) .  T h e  P a n e l  c o n c l u d e d  t h a t  
Members are not permitted to “balance more favourable tax treatment 
of  imported  products  in  some  instances  against  less  favourable  tax 
treatment  of  imported  products  in  other  instances.”70) 
2. “ Not  Similarly  Taxed”
I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  v e r y  s t r i c t  s t a n d a r d  o f  “in  excess  of”, t h e  “not 
similarly taxed” standard means excessive taxation which is over the 
de  minimis  level.  The  de  minimis m a r g i n  v a r i e s  f r o m  c a s e  t o  c a s e . 71) 
This  means  that  in  some  cases  a  tax  difference  of  1%  would  be  said 
to be permissible under the second sentence, while in others it would 
be considered unjustifiable. It seems that the decisive factor for the de 
minimis  determination  would  be  the  question  of  to  what  extent  the 
tax  differential  affects  the  competitive  relationship  between  imported 
and domestic products. If it is found that the tax burden on imports 
is heavy enough to move on to the final stage of the three-tiered test 
of Article III:2, second sentence, the remaining element is to establish 
the  protective  application  of  the  tax. 
70)  Ibid.,  paras.  11.257-11.263.
71) WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 21, 
pp.  26-27.V.  Protective  Application
T h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  p u r p o s e  o f  A r t i c l e  I I I  i s  t o  “avoid  protectionism 
i n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  i n t e r n a l  t a x  a n d  r e g u l a t o r y  m e a s u r e s ” b y  
requiring  equality  of  competitive  conditions  between  imported  and 
domestic products.72) However, this is not a ground for justifying the 
“aim-and-effect”  test  in  the  context  of  the  likeness  assessment.  In 
addition, A r t i c l e  I I I  a l s o  e n s u r e s  t h a t  d o m e s t i c  m e a s u r e s  d o  n o t  
undermine tariff commitments of WTO Members under GATT Article 
II, t h o u g h  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  A r t i c l e  I I I  i s  b r o a d e r , g i v e n  t h a t  t h e  
national  treatment  obligation  covers  both  bound  and  unbound 
products.73) A s  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  G A T T  p r e p a r a t o r y  d o c u m e n t s , t h e  
national  treatment  clause  was  aimed  not  only  to  protect  scheduled 
concessions  but  also  to  prevent  the  use  of  internal  taxes  and 
regulations  as  a  system  of  protection.74)
Article  III:1  stipulates  that  internal  taxes  and  charges  “should  not 
be  applied  to  imported  or  domestic  products  so  as  to  afford 
protection  to  domestic  production.” T h i s  “general  principle” i n f o r m s  
the  rest  of  Article  III  and  constitutes  part  of  the  context  of  each 
paragraph  of  this  Article.  As  for  paragraph  2  of  Article  III, t h e  
general  principle  informs  the  first  sentence  and  the  second  sentence 
i n  d i f f e r e n t  w a y s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  t e x t u a l  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e m.75) 
72) Ibid., p. 16 ; WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada  – Periodicals, supra note 
41,  p.  18.
73) WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 21, 
pp.  16-17.
74)  UN,  EPCT/TAC/PV.10  (1947), p .  3 , c i t e d  i n  J a c k s o n ,  supra  note  17, p .  
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As there is no specific reference in the first sentence of Article III:2 
to the general principle of Article III:1, the Appellate Body in Japan – 
Alcoholic  Beverages  II  considered  that  the  protective  application  of  a 
contested  measure  does  not  need  to  be  established  separately  from 
the  specific  requirements  of  the  first  sentence,  though  the  first 
sentence  is  “in  effect”  an  application  of  this  general  principle.76) Th is  
appears to suggest that the anti-protectionism principle is incorporated 
i n t o  t h e  f i r s t  s e n t e n c e  t h r o u g h  t h e  s t r i c t  s t a n d a r d s  o f  “like” a n d  “in 
excess  of” s o  t h a t  a n  a f f i r m a t i v e  c o n c l u s i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  b o t h  
criteria  would  implicitly  indicate  the  protectionist  nature  of  the 
measure. 
In  contrast, A r t i c l e  I I I : 2 , s e c o n d  s e n t e n c e  e x p l i c i t l y  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  
general  principle  of  Article  III:1.  The  issue  of  protective  application 
requires “a comprehensive and objective analysis of the structure and 
application  of  the  measure  in  question  on  domestic  as  compared  to 
imported products.” In some cases, a substantially high tax differential 
i t s e l f  m a y  s u g g e s t  t h a t  d i s s i m i l a r  t a x a t i o n  h a s  b e e n  e m p l o y e d  s o  as 
to afford protection. In most cases , however , there are other relevant 
factors  to  be  considered  in  this  context.77) F o r  e x a m p l e , i n  Japan  – 
Alcoholic  Beverages  II,  it  was  found  that  Japanese  “shoju” w a s  
effectively protected from foreign competition through a combination 
of high import duties and dissimilar internal taxes.78) Accordingly, the 
tariff may serve as a pertinent factor. In the same case, the Appellate 
75) WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 21, 
p.  18.
76)  Ibid.
77)  Ibid., p .  3 3 .
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Body held that the subjective intent of legislators and regulators in the 
d r a f t i n g  a n d  t h e  e n a c t m e n t  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  m e a s u r e  i s  i r r e l e v a n t  for 
establishing  the  protective  application  of  the  tax  measure.79) I n  Chile 
– Alcoholic Beverages, it further observed that “[t]he subjective intentions 
i n h a b i t i n g  t h e  m i n d s  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  l e g i s l a t o r s  o r  r e g u l a t o r s  d o  n o t  
bear upon the inquiry, if only because they are not accessible to treaty 
interpreters.” At the same time, while these “subjective” intentions are 
not  relevant, t h e  s t a t u t o r y  p u r p o s e s  –  that  is, t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  a  
Member’s  legislature  and  government  as  a  whole  – are  pertinent  “to 
the extent that they are given objective expression in the statute itself”. 
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  A p p e l l a t e  B o d y ,  this  objective  expression  can  be 
discerned from the design, the architecture, and the revealing structure 
of  a  measure.80)  However,  what  each  of  these  factors  means  is  not 
clear from the existing jurisprudence. The “design” probably refers to 
a  policy  objective  behind  a  tax  measure, w h i l e  t h e  “architecture” t o  
the form of the tax law, and the “revealing structure” to the protective 
application  resulting  from  a  tax  imposition.81)
Surprisingly, in Canada  – Periodicals, th e Appellate Body put s ome 
weight on the statements of Canadian government officials about the 
policy  objectives  of  the  Excise  Tax  Act  in  order  to  emphasize  its 
protectionist  nature.82)  Noting  this  “change”  in  the  Appellate  Body’s 
attitude, t h e  P a n e l  i n  Chile  –  Alcoholic  Beverages a s s u m e d  t h a t  t h e  
79)  Ibid.,  pp.  27-28.
80)  WTO  Appellate  Body  Report,  Chile  –  Alcoholic  Beverages,  supra n o t e  9 , 
para.  62.
81)  See  이재형 (2000),  pp.  34-36.
82)  WTO  Appellate  Body  Report,  Canada  –  Periodicals,  supra n o t e  4 1 , p p .  
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Appellate  Body  may  still  consider  statements  of  a  government  rather 
t h a n  t h o s e  o f  individual  legislators,  as  the  stated  objectives  of  the 
government  would  be  relevant  in  evaluating  the  “design” o f  a  
measure, w h e r e a s  s t a t e m e n t s  o f  individual  legislators  would  not.83) I t  
seems  that  the  subjective  intent  factor  is  not  entirely  excluded  from 
the  scope  of  Article  III:2, s e c o n d  s e n t e n c e .  A t  l e a s t , i t  c a n  p l a y  t h e  
role  of  a  supplementary  –  i.e.  non-decisive  –  element  to  support 
conclusions  on  other  factors  of  the  protective  application  analysis. 
Indeed, t h e  P a n e l  i n  Chile  –  Alcoholic  Beverages n o t e d  t h a t  t h e  
government officials’ statements are only useful as a factor confirming 
other  evidence.84) 
83)  WTO  Panel  Report,  Chile  –  Taxes  on  Alcoholic  Beverages,  WT/DS87/R, 
WT/DS110/R,  adopted  12  January  2000,  para.  7.118.
84)  Ibid.,  para.  7.120.VI.  National  Treatment  under  Korea  FTAs
A s  n o t e d  i n  S e c t i o n  I  o f  t h i s  p a p e r ,  the  national  treatment  clause 
originally  appeared  in  bilateral  commercial  agreements  before  being 
introduced  to  the  GATT.  However,  with  the  current  rise  of 
regionalism, o n e  c a n  s e e  t h e  o p p o s i t e  t r e n d  o f  r e i n t r o d u c i n g  t h i s  
principle  from  the  GATT  into  the  regional  trade  agreements.  This 
s e c t i o n  i s  a b o u t  h o w  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e  i s  s e t  f o r t h  u n d e r  K o r e a  F T As.
As  of  1  January  2008, K o r e a  h a s  c o n c l u d e d  f i v e  F T A s  w i t h  C h i l e , 
Singapore, EFTA, ASEAN (trade in goods and services) and US. Korea-US 
FTA  and  Korea-ASEAN  FTA  (trade  in  services)  have  not  entered  into 
force yet. These agreem ents provide that the parties affirm  their existing 
rights and obligations vis-à-vis  each  other  under  the  WTO  Agreement.85) 
Accordingly,  each  party  has  a  commitment  to  accord  national  treatment 
t o  t h e  g o o d s  o f  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t y  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  A r t i c l e  I I I  of  the 
G A T T .  T o  t h i s  e n d ,  GATT  Article  III  and  its  interpretative  notes  are 
i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  a n d  m a d e  p a r t  o f  t h e  g i v e n  F T A s . 86) 
85)  Article  1.3.1  of  Korea-Chile  FTA, A r t i c l e  1 . 3 . 1  o f  K o r e a - S i n g a p o r e  F T A , 
Article  1.5  of  Korea-EFTA  FTA,  Article  1.4.2  of  Framework  Agreement 
on  Comprehensive  Economic  Cooperation  among  the  Governments  of 
the Republic of Korea and the Member Countries of the Association of 
Southeast  Asian  Nations,  Article  1.2.1  of  Korea-US  FTA.
86)  Article  3.3.1  of  Korea-Chile  FTA, A r t i c l e  3 . 3  o f  K o r e a - S i n g a p o r e  F T A , 
Article  2.6  of  Korea-EFTA  FTA, A r t i c l e  2  o f  A g r e e m e n t  o n  T r a d e  i n  
Goods  under  the  Framework  Agreement  on  Comprehensive  Economic 
Cooperation among the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the 
Member  Countries  of  the  Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations, 
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W T O  c a s e  l a w  o n  A r t i c l e  I I I  w i l l  a l s o  p r o v i d e  s o m e  u s e f u l  
g u i d a n c e  w h e n  a  d i s p u t e  a r i s e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  F T A  p a r t i e s  o v e r  t h e  
application  of  the  national  treatment  clause.  Korea  FTAs  provide  for 
the  complainant’s  right  to  choose  between  the  WTO  or  FTA  dispute 
settlement  mechanisms.87)  If  the  matter  is  referred  to  a  WTO  panel, 
the panel will most likely follow the existing jurisprudence due to the 
de  facto  stare  desisis  rule.  However, F T A  a r b i t r a l  p a n e l s  a r e  n o t  
constrained  by  rulings  of  the  WTO  Dispute  Settlement  Body  (DSB) 
and  may  thus  apply  and  construe  the  GATT  provisions  differently. 
Therefore, a complaining party may prefer to resort to the FTA panel 
procedure  if, f o r  e x a m p l e ,  it  wants  to  avail  itself  of  the  “aim- 
and-effect” t e s t , w h i c h  w a s  r e j e c t e d  i n  t h e  W T O  b u t  s t i l l  h a s  t h e  
potential  to  be  used  in  the  FTA  context.     
S o m e  K o r e a  F T A s  c o n t a i n  “GATT-plus” e l e m e n t s  –  provisions 
w h i c h  a r e  n o t  f o u n d  i n  G A T T  A r t i c l e  I I I .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  Korea-Chile 
FTA  reads  that:
For  the  purpose  of  paragraph  1  [on  national  treatment 
under GATT Article III], each Party shall grant to the goods of 
the  other  Party  a  treatment  no  less  favourable  t h a n  t h e  m o s t  
favourable  treatment  granted  by  that  Party  to  its  own  like  or 
directly competitive or substitutable goods of national origin.88) 
(emphasis  added)
87)  Article  19.3  of  Korea-Chile  FTA,  Article  20.3  of  Korea-Singapore  FTA, 
Article  9.1  of  Korea-EFTA  FTA, A r t i c l e  2 . 5  o f  A g r e e m e n t  o n  D i s p u t e  
Settlement  Mechanism  under  Korea-ASEAN  FTA,  and  Article  22.6  of 
Korea-US  FTA. 
88)  Article  3.3.2  of  Korea-Chile  FTA.VI.  National  Treatment  under  Korea  FTAs    47
W i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  i n t e r n a l  t a x e s ,  this  suggests  that,  inter  alia, t h e  
l o w e s t  p o s s i b l e  t a x  r a t e  e n v i s a g e d  f o r  d o m e s t i c  l i k e , d i r e c t l y  
competitive  or  substitutable  products  –  a s  t h e  c a s e  m a y  b e  –  is 
applicable  to  the  other  party’s  product  concerned.  In  Korea-US  FTA, 
the obligation to accord such most favorable treatment is imposed on 
a  regional  level  of  government.89)  This  obligation  is  pertinent  to  the 
US  only, a s  t h e  F T A  i t s e l f  c l e a r l y  s t i p u l a t e s  t h a t  t h e  t e r m  “regional 
level of government” means, for the US, a state of the US, the District 
of  Columbia, o r  P u e r t o  R i c o ; w h e r e a s  f o r  K o r e a , t h e  c o n c e p t  i n  
question is not applicable.90) Interestingly, the Korea-US FTA provision 
on  national  treatment  refers  to  “any  like,  directly  competitive, o r  
substitutable goods” putting a comma between “competitive” and “or 
substitutable.”91) Whether it was made for a merely technical purpose, 
or  intentionally  to  separate  the  “directly  competitive”  standard  from 
the  “substitutable” ( w i t h o u t  “directly”)  standard  is  an  open  question.
Under  Korea-Chile  FTA, n o t  o n l y  “existing”  measures  but  also 
“proposed” o n e s  m a y  b e  t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  a  c o m p l a i n t . 92) T h i s  c l e a r l y  
g o e s  b e y o n d  t h e  s c o p e  o f  c h a l l e n g e a b l e  m e a s u r e s  u n d e r  t h e  W T O  
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes  (DSU).  If  an  arbitral  panel  established  under  the  FTA  finds 
that a proposed measure by Korea or Chile would violate the national 
treatment  obligation, t h a t  p a r t y , w h e r e v e r  p o s s i b l e , m u s t  “abstain 
from  executing  the  measure.”93)  
89)  Article  2.2.2  of  Korea-US  FTA.
90)  Article  1.4  of  Korea-US  FTA.
91)  Article  2.2.2  of  Korea-US  FTA.
92)  Article  19.2(b)  of  Korea-Chile  FTA.
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K o r e a - U S  F T A  e n v i s a g e s  s o m e  e x c e p t i o n s  t o  b o t h  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
treatment  principle, a n d  i m p o r t  a n d  e x p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  N a m e l y , 
actions  authorized  by  the  WTO  DSB  are  not  subject  to  national 
treatment.94) T h i s  i s  t h e  c a s e  f o r  s u s p e n s i o n  o f  t h e  G A T T  A r t i c l e  I I I  
obligation authorized pursuant to DSU Article 22. Another exceptional 
case  involves  the  party’s  measures  to  address  market  disruption  in 
accordance  with  procedures  that  have  been  incorporated  into  the 
WTO  Agreement.95) W h i l e  t h e  t w o  i n s t a n c e s  a b o v e  a r e  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  
both  parties,  the  US  has  reserved  for  itself  two  more  exemptions, 
n a m e l y  ( 1 )  a n y  c o n t r o l  o n  t h e  e x p o r t  o f  l o g s  o f  a l l  s p e c i e s  w h i ch 
appears to be pertinent to import and export restrictions, rather than 
national treatment, and (2) any measure under the so called Jones Act 
which requires that vessels carrying passengers and goods within the 
US  to  be  built  and  documented  in  the  US, o w n e d  a n d  r u n  b y  U S  
citizens.96) I n i t i a l l y ,  this  Act  had  been  justified  in  GATT  1947  by  a 
“grandfather” clause which was later reintroduced in GATT 1994 and 
is now subject to regular reviews by the WTO Ministerial Conference.97) 
Notwithstanding  the  multilateral  exception, t h e  U S  g o v e r n m e n t  h a s  
p e r s i s t e n t l y  s e c u r e d  t h e  J o n e s  A c t  e x c e p t i o n  i n  i t s  F T A s . 98)
94)  Annex  2-A,  Section  A(a)  and  Section  B(c)  of  Korea-US  FTA.
95)  Annex  2-A,  Section  A(b)  and  Section  B(d)  of  Korea-US  FTA.
96)  US  Merchant  Marine  Act  of  1920,  46  App.  U.S.C.  883. 
97)  See  paragraph  3  of  GATT  1994. 
98)  See  e.g. A n n e x  3 . 2  o f  U S - C h i l e  F T A , A n n e x  2 A  o f  U S - S i n g a p o r e  F T A , 
and  Annex  2-A  of  US-Australia  FTA.VII.  Conclusion 
The GATT national treatment clause on internal taxation is relatively 
straightforward.  However,  it  involves  a  multitude  of  complex  issues 
d e p e n d i n g  o n  w h a t  s e n t e n c e  o f  A r t i c l e  I I I : 2  i s  i n v o k e d .  G i v e n  t he 
broader  product  coverage  in  Article  III:2, s e c o n d  s e n t e n c e , t h e  
complaining  party  may  prefer  to  invoke  the  second  sentence  instead 
of  resorting  to  the  first  sentence  which  employs  a  stricter  likeness 
s t a n d a r d .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  the  first  sentence  does  not  require  a 
determination of the protectionist purpose or effect, nor does it allow 
a de minimis threshold for the tax differential. Accordingly, the overall 
b u r d e n  o f  c h a l l e n g e  o f  t h e  t a x  m e a s u r e , w h e t h e r  u n d e r  t h e  f i r s t  
sentence  or  the  second  sentence, s e e m s  t o  b e  v i r t u a l l y  t h e  s a m e .  
In  the  wake  of  on-going  trade  liberalization  and  ever-increasing 
transparency  in  government  actions,  WTO  Members  will  tend  to  use 
sophisticated  means  of  protection  of  domestic  production  through 
origin-neutral, rather than origin-specific, measures. Obviously, complaining 
M e m b e r s  w i l l  b e a r  h e a v i e r  b u r d e n  o f  p r o o f  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  i m p l i cit 
or  de  facto  discrimination  to  expose  disguised  protectionism  behind 
the  contested  measure.
Some discrepancy in the Appellate Body’s approach to the subjective 
i n t e n t  i s s u e  s e e m s  t o  l e a v e  s o m e  r o o m  f o r  r e f e r r i n g  t o  g o v e r n m e nt 
statements  in  future  analyses  of  protective  application.  At  least, 
interested  parties  will  tend  to  submit  such  evidence  to  persuade 
panels  or  the  Appellate  Body  of  the  protectionist  purpose  of  a 
contested  measure.  However,  it  appears  that  the  adjudicatory  bodies 
will  most  likely  avoid  relying  on  these  sources  as  primary  evidence 
for  their  findings. 50    National  Treatment  on  Internal  Taxation:  Revisiting  GATT  Article  III:2
Korea  and  its  FTA  partners  have  affirmed  their  adherence  to 
G A T T  A r t i c l e  I I I .  W h e n  t h e  F T A  p a r t i e s  e n t e r  i n t o  a  d i s p u t e  o v e r 
national treatment, the problem of applicable law may arise. Specifically, 
c a n  W T O  p a n e l s  a p p l y  o r  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  G A T T - p l u s  p r o v i s i o n s  o n  
n a t i o n a l  t r e a t m e n t  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  F T A ,  i.e. n o n - W T O  t r e a t y ?  I t  
seems  that  panel’s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  m a y  c o v e r  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  q u e s t i o n  
i f  t h e  p a r t i e s  a g r e e ,  pursuant  to  DSU  Article  7.3,  on  non-standard 
terms  of  reference  of  the  panel  where  those  provisions  are  explicitly 
listed.99) Alternatively, in order to avoid some possible jurisprudential 
difficulties, t h e  p a r t i e s  m a y  c h o o s e  t o  r e f e r  t h e  m a t t e r  t o  a n  F T A  
panel,  instead  of  launching  a  WTO  dispute  settlement  procedure.  In 
any case – be it a WTO panel acting on the basis of special terms of 
reference or an FTA panel – the GATT-plus national treatment clause, 
as  a  lex  posterior,  should  prevail  over  the  corresponding  GATT 
provision.100) Finally, given the incorporation of GATT Article III into 
the  FTA  text, i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  F T A  p a n e l s ,  wherever  possible, 
f o l l o w  t h e  W T O  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  A r t i c l e  I I I  p r o v i s i o n s  t o  s e c ure 
c o n s i s t e n t  a n d  p r e d i c t a b l e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  t r e a t m e n t  rule.
99)  See  Pauwelyn  (2003),  pp.  444-445.
1 0 0 )  A r t i c l e  3 0 . 3  o f  t h e  V i e n n a  C o n v e n t i o n  o n  t h e  L a w  o f  T r e a t i es  reads:
When  all  the  parties  to  the  earlier  treaty  are  parties  also  to  the  later 
t r e a t y  b u t  t h e  e a r l i e r  t r e a t y  i s  n o t  t e r m i n a t e d  o r  s u s p e n d e d  i n  
operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent 
t h a t  i t s  p r o v i s i o n s  a r e  c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  t h o s e  o f  t h e  l a t e r  t r e a ty.References
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